Table 4 Comparison of features offered by secure deletion approaches for flash-based storage systems
From: Ensuring data confidentiality via plausibly deniable encryption and secure deletion – a survey
Scheme | Method | Layer | Deletion granularity |
|---|---|---|---|
Scrubbing (Wei et al. 2011) and SmSD (Qin et al. 2013) | Overwriting-based | Controller (FTL) | A physical page |
Sun et al. (Sun et al. 2008) | Overwriting-based | File system (YAFFS) | Single file |
Zero overwriting (Reardon et al. 2012) | Overwriting-based | File system (YAFFS) | Single file |
Trim (Intel Corporation: Intel Solid-State Drive Optimizer 2009) and | |||
TrueErase (Diesburg et al. 2012) | Overwriting-based | File system | Single file |
to device driver | |||
Purging and ballooning (Reardon et al. 2012) | Overwriting-based | Application | All the invalid data |
Braga et al. (Braga and Colito 2014) for | Overwriting-based | Application | All the invalid data |
unencrypted files | |||
SAFE (Swanson and Wei 2010) | Based on overwriting | Controller | The entire |
and encryption | storage medium | ||
Encryption-based | File system (YAFFS) | Single file | |
Lee et al. (2011) | Encryption-based | File system (YAFFS) | Single file |
DNEFS (Reardon et al. 2012) | Encryption-based | File system (UBIFS) | Single file |
DEFY (Peters et al. 2015) | Encryption-based | File system (YAFFS) | Single file |
Braga and Colito (2014) for | Encryption-based | File system (EncFS) | Single file |
encrypted files |