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Table 2 Comparison of IB-DRE Schemes from Lattices

From: (Identity-based) dual receiver encryption from lattice-based programmable hash functions with high min-entropy

 

# of

# of

# of

  

Standard

Schemes

\(\mathbb {Z}_{q}^{n\times m}\) matrix

\(\mathbb {Z}_{q}^{m\times m}\) matrix

\(\mathbb {Z}_{q}^{m}\) vector

Assumption

Security

model

 

|PP|

|Msk|

|c|

  

?

WB’10 (Wang and Bi 2010)

1

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

ROM

Ours:

      

IB−DREABB

\(\mathcal {O}(n)\)

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

\(\checkmark \)

IB−DREZCZ

\(\mathcal {O}(\log {Q})\)

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

\(\checkmark \)

IB−DREYam

\(\omega (\sqrt {n})\)

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

\(\checkmark \)

IB−DREMAH

ω(log2n)

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

\(\checkmark \)

IB−DREAFF

ω(logn)

1

3

LWE

IND-ID-CPA

\(\checkmark \)

  1. , |PP|,|Msk| and |c| show the size of public parameters, master secret key and ciphertext, respectively. Q is the number bound of the secret key queries