Continuously non-malleable codes from block ciphers in split-state model

Cybersecurity

Table 1 Comparison of various continuously non-malleable codes in the split-state model

Reference	Model	Assumption	Types of tampering	Adversarial capability
Faust et al. (2014a, 2020)	Comp., CRS	Collision resistant hash, NIZK Leakage resilient storage	Non-persistent with self-destruct	Polynomial number of tampering attacks & bounded leakage attacks
Aggarwal et al. (2017)	I.T.	–	Persistent with self-destruct	Unbounded adversary with polynomial number of tampering attacks & bounded leakage attacks
Faonio et al. (2018)	Comp., CRS	NIZK, Non-interactive commitment Leakage resilient public key encryption	Non-persistent with self-destruct	Polynomial number of tampering attacks & bounded leakage attacks
Ostrovsky et al. (2018)	Comp.	One-to-one One-way function	Non-persistent with self-destruct	Unbounded adversary with polynomial number of tampering attacks & bounded leakage attacks
Our work	Comp., CRS	NIZK, Strong PRP, Leakage resilient storage	Non-persistent with self-destruct	Polynomial number of tampering attacks & bounded leakage attacks

In the table IT stands for information-theoretic, Comp. stands for computational